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i. 
ARGUMENT IN 
A. Sworn Complaint 
The state makes no attempt to establish that the prosecutor swore, under oath, to 
the contents of the formal complaint. State's Br., pp. 4-6. The state also does not defend the 
district court's position that the formal complaint was based on the uniform citation-it 
clearly was not. Instead, the state argues only that a "written oath appears right in the 
amended complaint." State's Br., p. 5 (emphasis added). The state then cites Rule 2.2 of the 
fdaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules ("MCR"). State's Br., p. 5. 
Howeve1~ the state does not quote that rule. The state's omission is quite telling, 
because MCR 2.2 requires more than the statement contained in the formal complaint. 
Therefore, the state is incorrect when it claims that the formal complaint met the 
requirements of MCR 2.2. MCR 2.2 states as follows: "Whenever these rules require or 
permit a written statement to be made under oath or affirmation, such statement may be 
made as provided in Idaho Code Section 9-1406. An affidavit includes a written 
certification or declaration made as provided in Idaho Code Section 9-1406." (Emphasis 
added). 
If the state is correct that the formal complaint satisfied MCR 2.2, then the formal 
complaint must have met the requirements of [daho Code section 9-1406. But the formal 
complaint did not meet those requirements. Idaho Code section 9-1406 provides: 
Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order or 
requirement made pursuant to a law of this state, any matter is required or 
permitted to be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the sworn 
statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, affirmation or affidavit, 
in writing, of the person making the same, other than a deposition, an oath 
1 
or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other 
notary public, matter may with like force and effect 
by the unsworn or 
declaration, writing, which is by such person 
substantially the following form: 
"I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the 
State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct" (Emphasis added). 
First, MCR 2.2 does not apply. MCR 2.2 only applies "as provided in Idaho Code 
Section 9~1406." That section does not apply when the oath must be "taken before a 
specified official other than a notary public .... " Here, the oath must be made before the 
magistrate. I.C.R. 3 ("The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting 
the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a magistrate ... :') (Emphasis 
added). Obviously, a magistrate is "a specified official other than a notary public:' 
Therefore, section 9-1406 does not apply, and hence MCR 2.2 does not apply.1 
Second, even if MCR 2.2 applied, the complaint's language was not substantially 
similar to the language of Idaho Code section 9-1406. rn contrast to the declaration 
described in that statute, the formal complaint simply states that the prosecutor "who being 
duly sworn, complains and says .... " R. 84. It then concludes with the statement, applicable 
to the magistrate, that it was "SUBSCRrBED AND SWORN To before" the magistrate. R. 86. 
It is uncontested that the prosecutor never swore to the contents of the complaint when it 
was signed. Therefore, the complaint simply makes representations that are contradicted 
by the record, namely, (1) that the prosecutor was "duly sworn," and (2) that it was sworn 
to before the magistrate. Neither of those things happened. 




document were "true and correct," and that the statement was made "under penalty of 
perjury." l.C. § 9-1406. The complaint contains no guarantee whatsoever about the truth of 
the statements therein, nor does it contain a statement that it was under penalty of perjury. 
It instead falsely claims that it was "sworn to" before the magistrate when it was 
"subscribed." Further, again in contrast to the statute, the complaint tells us nothing about 
what was sworn to; therefore, it is not substantially in the form of the statement contained 
in Idaho Code section 9-1406. Suffice it to say that, if the complaint's statements were 
considered sufficient under the statute, then the language provided by the legislature 
would be watered down beyond recognition. 
Mr~ McEvoy entered a guilty plea "to the Amended Complaint." R. 113; see, Smith v. 
State, 94 ldaho 535, 536 (1972) (stating that the post~conviction relief petitioner "pied 
guilty to the information" filed in the underlying criminal case). The amended complaint 
was not valid; therefore, there was nothing to which he could plead guilty, and the guilty 
plea therefore was not valid. 
B. Fundamental Error and Waiver of Issues by Pleading Guilty 
The state proffers an alternative argument that M1: McEvoy must establish 
fundamental error in order to prevail on appeal. State's Br., p. 5. The state also notes that 
any non-jurisdictional defect was waived by the defendant's guilty plea. State's Br., p. 6 n. 3. 
However, the state is the party that has waived its arguments. The arguments were waived 
at the district court level. 
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to be at any 
error. v. 1 
("where there is a jurisdictional defect, this court has authority to address that issue, even if 
it is not raised by the parties themselves.") 
Regarding non·jurisdictional issues, the state appears to have misapplied the correct 
standard of review. This matter is on appeal from the district court. For nearly a decade, 
the Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that higher appellate courts directly review the 
decision of a district court that acted in its appellate capacity. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 
Idaho 670, 672 (2008) ("for nearly two decades, we have effectively ignored the structure 
of our appellate rules and issued opinions in which we have directly addressed the decision 
of the magistrate. [H]enceforth, our decisions will reflect our application of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules.") 
To the district court, the state never argued that Mr. McEvoy failed to establish 
fundamental error. R. 153-161. The district court did not reach that issue eithe1: R. 
166-77. To the extent that the state now argues this point, the issue is waived. In fact, even 
before Losser, the Idaho Supreme Court would consider the state's arguments forfeited if 
they were not presented to the district court acting in its appellate capacity. In State v. 
Watkins, for example, the "State contend[ ed] this Court should decline to address the issues 
raised by Watkins on the basis that the appeal is untimely and in violation of I.AR. 14( a), 
which provides that an appeal must be filed within 42 days of the order appealed." 143 
Idaho 217, 220 (2006). The Supreme Court refused to consider the question, stating that 
"The timeliness of the appeal from the magistrate court to the district court was not 
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raised the district court and wm not be addressed by Court" 
This is a case of "waiving the waiver." Idaho's case law provides that the state cannot 
argue the issue of waiver unless it made that argument below. It did not Therefore, it is 
the state that has waived its arguments on appeal. Mr. McEvoy has contended that he 
cannot plead guilty to an invalid amended complaint To the extent the state maintains that 
this argument was waived by Mr. McEvoy's guilty piea, or that Mr. McEvoy failed to establish 
fundamental error, the state has waived its argument. 
Regardless, as explained, it should be dear that the guilty plea is itself at issue if the 
subject of the guilty plea, i.e., the charging document, is defective. See, Smith, supra. 
C. Jurisdiction 
The state used the term "specious" to describe Mr. McEvoy's argument regarding the 
uniform citation. State's Br., p. 6.2 Unfortunately, the state has misunderstood, and 
consequently misrepresented, Mr. McEvoy's argument. SpecificaHy, the state suggests that 
Mr. McEvoy's argument is that "all jurisdictional defects involve violations of the procedural 
rules and therefore all violations of the rules are jurisdictional .... " State's B1:, p. 6. To 
counter this straw man argument-an argument Mr. McEvoy never made-the state 
explains that the "applicable legal standard ... requires only a citation 'alleging an offense 
was committed within the State of ldaho' in order to confer 'subject matter jurisdiction 
upon the court."' State's Br., p. 6 (quoting State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223 (2004)). 
2 The state has used several insulting terms to describe Mr. McEvoy's arguments, including "specious,'' 
"dubious;' and "frivolous." In Mi: McEvoy's opinion, these terms are not warranted by the arguments he has 
presented to this Court 
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not are 
Rather, Mr. McEvoy argues that jurisdiction is lacking when there exists a failure to follow 
procedural rules specific to the commencement of a proceeding. Thus, in State v. Lute, 
jurisdiction was lacking when the grand jury issued an indictment-the felony equivalent of 
a uniform citation-that was in violation of the rules applicable to the issuance of an 
indictment. 150 Idaho 837. Because the charge was not properly commenced according to 
the rules, there was no jurisdiction. Id. at 841. 
As explained already, specific requirements apply to the initiation of a case by 
uniform citation. One of those requirements is that the applicable form be used. That 
requirement is mandatory. MCR S(g) (a uniform citation "shall be in the following form") 
( emphasis added). In certain respects) that form requires more than what is required for a 
formal complaint, indictment, or information. It requires that the citing officer identify the 
date of the offense, which is something that did not occur in this case. The procedure 
specific to initiating a case therefore was not followed. As a result, the case was not 
initiated, because the procedure was mandatory. 
Second, the state dearly missed this point when the state argued that the language 
in the citation was sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirements of a charging 
document. No doubt, it is true that a charging document must "aHeg[e] an offense was 
committed within the State of Idaho" in order to confer subject~matter jurisdiction. But 
that standard applies to a different element of the jurisdictional requirements enunciated in 
Rogers. The requirement is that "The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an 
6 
was matter upon 
court." 
In Lute, there VJas no question that the state did "allege an offense was committed in 
the State of Idaho." The defect was not the "alleging an offense was committed" element; 
the defect was the "indictment" element of jurisdiction. Id. at 841 ("On appeal, the State 
devotes much of its argument to the issue of a 'defective indictment' and the effect of a 
guilty plea on 'defects' in grand jury proceedings. However, there was no 'defective' 
indictment in this case; rather there was no indictment under the law.") (Emphasis 
added). 
Here, there was no uniform citation under the law. As explained, the prescribed 
form is required to be used; it is not discretionary. Thus, the issue is not the allegations 
themselves, but the fact that the form was not followed. If the form was not followed, it 
was not a uniform citation at all. If no uniform citation \Vas submitted, then the case was 
never commenced. The issue is the "uniform citation" requirement, not the "alleging the 
offense was committed in the state of Idaho" requirement. The state focused its argument 
entirely on a point Mr. McEvoy never made on this appeal. It therefore failed to refute, or 
even address, Mr. McEvoy's argument. 
D. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
The state argues, for the first tin1e on appeal, that the magistrate's order, which 
granted the state's request to view the property, "was the equivalent of a search warrant." 
State's Br., p. 10 n. 5. Of course, as explained above, this argument is waived because it was 
not raised below. Regardless, it is not true. Warrants may issue only from a "neutra1 and 
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officer the 
out v. lt is 
difficult to believe that the magistrate could be considered "neutral and detached" when he 
was the person performing the investigation itself, in order to inform himself of 
information to be used at his own sentencing hearing. 
In addition, a warrant must be supported by an affidavit, and no affidavit supported 
the state's motion. IDAHO CONST. ART. I§ 17 ("The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.") The magistrate1s 
order is not a search warrant. 
The state also argues that Mr. McEvoy never waived his Fourth Amendment rights, 
and "should have challenged that order as erroneous on appeal and sought the applicable 
remedy of suppressing evidence," State's B1~, p. 10-11. The state's argument only highlights 
the problem with the guilty plea and resulting search. If Mr. McEvoy's only remedy is 
suppression of the evidence, then he would be without any meaningful remedy for the 
violation of his rights. Suppression of evidence is rarely allowed for purposes of sentencing. 
See, State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 300 (Ct. App. 2007) (Lansing, J., concurring). Moreover, 
if such a motion were granted, the judge would have been required to pretend that he never 
saw the evidence he saw. 
Mr. McEvoy argued that the search conducted on his property amounted to a waiver 
of his Fourth Amendment rights. Opening Br., p. 10. In other words, it was the equivalent of 
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a it was over as 
state it 
"no Fourth Amendment waiver appears on the record." State's Br., p. 10. The guilty plea 
was invalid because it resulted in a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, which was a 
direct consequence of his guilty plea. 
Interestingly, the state argues that this point was made without citation to authority. 
State's Br., p. 10. What Mr: McEvoy argued, however, was that the order was a direct 
consequence of his guilty plea, and cited State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95 (2007) for that 
proposition. Opening Br., p. 11. The magistrate's order fell within the definition of "direct 
consequence," and fell outside the definition of "collateral consequence." Opening Br., pp. 
10~ 14. Ample authority was provided in support of that argument. The state has not even 
addressed the controlling issue on which it falsely claims authority was lacking: whether 
the court's order, which violated Mr. McEvoy's Fourth Amendment rights, was a direct 
consequence of the guilty plea. It was. 
E. Judicial Bias 
Defendants will almost never be capable of establishing judicial bias if this case does 
not qualify. It is not a case of a judge merely possessing "some knowledge of the facts or 
circumstances of a case .... " State's Br., p. 12. This is a case of a judge with a preformed 
opinion of the essential facts of the state's case against Mr. McEvoy. The magistrate did not 
state merely that he had seen the property; he stated that the property was "horrible" and 
that the condition of the property affected him so personally that he was "dismayed" by the 
property. Tr. p. 152, IL 13-20. 
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bias, not merely implied bias. As already stated, "actual bias, if disclosed, no doubt would 
be grounds for appropriate relief." Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 
(2009}. It is difficult to imagine a clearer disclosure of actual bias than the disclosure that 
occurred in this case. 
The state's only argument on this point is the conclusory statement that "the record 
does not show actual ... bias:' State's Br., p. 13. But of course, it clearly does. 
F. Sentencing 
The state does not contest Mr. McEvoy's position that the district court shouid not be 
reversed regarding the sentencing issue discussed in the opening brief. State's Br. pp. 
13-14; Opening Br., pp. 19-20. 
m. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the defendant's conviction and 
remand the case for dismissal; in the alternative, this Court should reverse and remand to 
permit Mr. McEvoy to withdraw his guilty plea; in the alternative, this Court should reverse 
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